C.O. Evans

© 1970

London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd
New York: Humanities Press Inc.

To Merlyn


PREFACE                                          Page 11


[1] The distinction between awareness of
self and knowledge of persons.
[2] Predilection of modern philosophy in
direction of knowledge of persons.
[3] Theories of self and awareness of self.
2. CONSCIOUSNESS                                 Page 37 
  1. Problems of Existence and Meaning

    [1] It is shown that William James' denial
    of consciousness is a rejection of a
    philosophical theory of consciousness and
    is no repudiation of consciousness itself.
    [2] An argument centering on Ryle and
    Wisdom to show that there is a basic sense
    of consciousness.
    [3] A rejection of the view that
    'consciousness' is undefinable, followed
    by a proposed definition along the lines
    suggested by James Mill.

  2. The Nature of the Concept                   Page 49

    [4] A comparison of the concepts 'conscious'
    and 'colour' to show a disanalogy which if
    not recognized leads to a false 'mosaic'
    view of consciousness.
    [5] Rejection of the view that
    'consciousness' stands for a common
    property of mental phenomena in favour
    of treating it as a polymorphous concept.
    [6] The concept of consciousness gains its
    applicability through the existence of the

  3. Sir William Hamilton and His Critics       Page 57

    [7] Hamilton's theory of consciousness.
    [8] The attack on Hamilton's Duality of
    Consciousness by J.S. Mill, Shadworth
    Hodgson, and William James.
    [9] The implications of the historical
    survey and the direction the self-approach
    must take.
    [10] The view of Samuel Alexander presented
    as heading in the right direction.
    [11] Conclusions presupposed in the
    analysis offered in succeeding chapters.

3. ATTENTION                                     Page 67 
  1. Consciousness and Change

    [1] The two dimensions of consciousness.
    [2] T.H.Ribot on the dependence of
    consciousness on change.
    [3] A contrast between the theories of
    attention of James Ward and William James.
    [4] Attention seen as the structuring
    of consciousness into foreground and

  2. Rejection of the Notion of an               Page 80
    Attention-Free Consciousness

    [5] The presence of attention in a pure
    sensuous consciousness.
    [6] Its presence in a state of reverie.
    [7] Conclusions drawn from this study.

  3. The Varieties of Attention                  Page 92

    [8] Rejection of Ribot's distinction
    between 'spontaneous' attention and
    'voluntary' attention.
    [9] The weaknesses in Hamilton's theory of
    [10] The relation between 'mere vital
    attention' and 'voluntary' attention.
    [11] 'Unordered' attention, 'interrogative'
    attention, and 'executive' attention; an
    alternative to the classification offered
    by Hamilton and Ribot.

4. UNPROJECTED CONSCIOUSNESS                     Page 104 
  1. The Structure of Consciousness

    [1] Attention and unprojected consciousness
    viewed as complements.
    [2] The character of unprojected

  2. Unprojected Consciousness and               Page 107
    Interrogative Attention

    [3] The logical character of ideational
    [4] The question of the possibility of
    simultaneous attention to a number of
    [5] Answer given in terms of the notion of
    a 'relevancy system'.
    [6] Ribot's theory that attention demands
    the suspension of change shown to be a
    misconception which the notion of a
    relevancy system can overcome.

  3. Unprojected Consciousness and               Page 122
    Executive Attention

    [7] The role of kinaesthetic sensation
    in executive attention.
    [8] The logical status of physiological
    processes in attention.

  4. The Logical Dependence of Mental            Page 128
    Images and Thoughts on Bodily Activity
    [9] A defence of Ribot's theory that even
    inner-directed attention (reflection) is
    dependent on bodily activity.
    [10] Arguments against the 'phantom
    approach' according to which the
    occurence of mental imagery is logically
    independent of bodily activity.
    [11] The alternative 'sentient approach'
    defended in terms of the notion of the
    'origin' of a mental image.
    [12] Utilization of the distinction
    between compatible and incompatible
    activities in support of the sentient
    [13] The most mental of all forms of
    reflection - the having of thoughts -
    held to be logically dependent on bodily
5. THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF                         Page 144 
  1. The Self as Unprojected Consciousness

    [1] The rationale of the theory.
    [2] The elusiveness of the self explained.
    [3] Rejection of the no-subject position.

  2. The Problems the Theory Solves              Page 153

    [4] Consideration of James's theory of the
    [5] Explanation of the connection between
    bodily sensation and the self.
    [6] Making of the self its own object only
    partially possible.
    [7] Analysis of Ayer's supplementation of
    James's theory.

  3. Support from Unexpected Quarters            Page 169

    [8] The loss of self in mystical ecstasy.
    [9] Theories forshadowing the one
    presented here.

  4. A Defense against Some Objections           Page 173

    [10] Difficulties which the theory has to
    [11] An answer to Strawson.

6. YESTERDAY'S SELF                              Page 182 
  1. The Past of a Self and the
    Past of a Person

    [1] The manner in which this is a concern
    of the self-approach as distinct from a
    concern of the persons approach.
    [2] Distinction between subjective time
    and objective time brought into account
    for interruptions in consciousness.

  2. Awareness as a State and Attention          Page 186
    as an Activity

    [3] The meaning I give to 'awareness'.
    [4] The logical characteristics of verbs
    of perception and the relation between
    perceiving and awareness.
    [5] The criteria of states and activities.
    [6] The logic of 'awareness' and the logic
    of 'attention'.

  3. The Dependence of a Persisting              Page 206
    Self on Sustaining Activity

    [7]The relation between attention and
    unprojected consciousness argued to demand
    a revision of Ryle's adverbial theory of
    [8] Application to perceptual concepts
    of the distinction between states and
    [9] The continuous creation of the self.

7. BODILY EXISTENCE                              Page 218 
[1] Selves and their bodily
[2] Our kind of body.
[3] The point of contact between the
self-approach and the persons approach.
[4] Appeal to mental acts rendered unnecessary
by the present theory.
INDEX                                            Page 235

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