© C.O. Evans & J. Fudjack
Notes and References -[table of contents] [previous] [next]
1. R.L. Ackoff, "Systems, organizations and interdisciplinary
research." In F.E. Emery (ed.), Systems thinking (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1969), p.343.
2. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, Consciousness east and west
(New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1978), p.119.
3. C.T. Tart, States of consciousness (New York:E.P. Dutton &
4. Ibid., p.4.
5. E.R. John, "A model of consciousness," In G.E. Schwartz and
D. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation, vol.I
(New York: Plenum Press, 1976), P.4.
6. Ibid., p.4.
7. C.T. Tart, op.cit., p.99.
8. Ibid., p.172.
9. Ibid., p.21.
10. G. Bateson, Steps to an ecology of mind (Frogmore, St. Albans,
Herts, U.K.: Paladin,1973), p.116.
11. U. Neisser, Cognition and reality (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman
& Co., 1976), p.10.
12. C.T. Tart, op.cit., p.62.
13. C.O. Evans, The subject of Consciousness (New York:Humanities
14. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.103.
15. Ibid., p.104.
16. L. von Bertalanffy, General systems theory,. rev.ed. (New
Inspection of the set of equations shows that the system will
be in a steady state or stationary state when f1 = f2 = ... =
fn = 0. Under certain conditions which can be mathematically
specified small changes in any Q will not change the state of
the system: the system, in Tart's terminology, will 'maintain
it's integrity or identity in spite of various (small)
changes." (See quotation page 11 of this study.)
1. R.L. Ackoff, "Systems, organizations and interdisciplinary research." In F.E. Emery (ed.), Systems thinking (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p.343.
2. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, Consciousness east and west (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1978), p.119.
3. C.T. Tart, States of consciousness (New York:E.P. Dutton & Co.,1975),. p.3.
4. Ibid., p.4.
5. E.R. John, "A model of consciousness," In G.E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation, vol.I (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), P.4.
6. Ibid., p.4.
7. C.T. Tart, op.cit., p.99.
8. Ibid., p.172.
9. Ibid., p.21.
10. G. Bateson, Steps to an ecology of mind (Frogmore, St. Albans, Herts, U.K.: Paladin,1973), p.116.
11. U. Neisser, Cognition and reality (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1976), p.10.
12. C.T. Tart, op.cit., p.62.
13. C.O. Evans, The subject of Consciousness (New York:Humanities Press, 1970).
14. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.103.
15. Ibid., p.104.
16. L. von Bertalanffy, General systems theory,. rev.ed. (New York:George Braziller,1968).p.56. Inspection of the set of equations shows that the system will be in a steady state or stationary state when f1 = f2 = ... = fn = 0. Under certain conditions which can be mathematically specified small changes in any Q will not change the state of the system: the system, in Tart's terminology, will 'maintain it's integrity or identity in spite of various (small) changes." (See quotation page 11 of this study.)
17. F. Varela, "Not one, not two," The Coevolution Quarterly, no.11(1076), p.63
18. M. Polanyi, Personal knowledge (New York:Harper Torchbooks,1964), p.x. Polanyi's understanding of the relationship between 'subsidiary awareness' and 'focal object' connects these terms with the whole-part relationship in the opposite way to the way we have it. He understands an object of attention to be a whole composed of parts of which we are subsidiarily aware when attending to the whole. According to Polanyi,
We know a comprehensive whole, for example a dog, by relying on our awareness of its parts for attending focally to the whole. [M. Polanyi,"Experience and the perception of pattern." in K.M. Sayre and F.J. Crosson, The modelling of mind (Notre Dame:Univ. of Notre Dame Press,1963), p.213]Our argument against Polanyi's position is essentially that we needn't be aware of each part of the object of attention in some way other than the way we are aware of it when attending to the entire object of attention. By contrast, in our use of the term 'subsidiary awareness' it can be said that an object of attention is a part of a whole of which we are subsidiarily aware. To this view Polanyi takes exception. Consequently, he says,
It is a mistake to identify subsidiary awareness with subconscious or preconscious awareness, or with the fringe of consciousness described by William James. [Ibid., p. 212.]But not only do we not see this as a mistake, we shall go on in the addendum of this work to show that this identification can be successfully made.
19. D. Bohm, The special theory of relativity (New York:W.A.Benjamin, 1965), p. 201.
20. Ibid., p. 197.
21. See B. Brown, New mind, new body (New York:Harper & Row,1974), p. 82, for a discussion of experimental findings suggesting an order of information existing at a purely physiological level.
22. E.R. John, op.cit., p. 3.
23. W.F. Fry, Sweet madness: a study of humor (Palo Alto: Pacific Books,1963), p. 154
24. G. Bateson, op.cit., p. 160.
26. S.K. Langer, An introduction to symbolic logic (New York:Dover,1938), p. 65.
27. G. Bateson, op.cit., p. 169.
28. G. Ryle, The concept of mind (London: Hutchinson's Univ. Lib.,1949), p. 100
29. Ibid., p. 83.
30. Ibid., p.84.
31. S. Freud, "Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol.20 (London:Hogarth Press,1959), p.132.
32. R.G. Collingwood, The new leviathan (London:Oxford Univ. Press,1942), P.18.
33. G. Ryle, op.cit., p.103.
34. F. Kreuger, "The essence of feeling." In M.B. Arnold (ed.), The nature of emotion (Baltimore: Penguin Books,1968), p.97.
35. This use of the word 'relevate' was first introduced by David
Bohm who explained it as meaning "to lift it into attention
so that it stands out 'in relief'." We construe the reference
to an 'it' to be a reference to an object of attention.
36. R.W. Leeper, "The motivational theory of emotion." In M.B. Arnold (ed.), The nature of emotion (Baltimore: Penguin Books,1968), p.185.
37. J.R.S. Wilson, Emotion and object (London: Cambridge Univ. Press,1972)
38. F. Leibniz, The monadology and other philosophical writings, translated by R. Latta (London: Oxford Univ. Press,1898), p.371.
39. R. Muchielli, Introduction to structural psychology, translated by S.L. Markmann (New York: Avon,1970), p.36.
40. Ibid., p.50.
41. C. Naranjo, "Vanishing magician-spectator, rabbit, and hat." In T. Tulku (ed.), Reflections of mind (Emeryville, Ca.:Dharma Publ.,1975), p.46.
42. A. Angyal, "A logic of systems." In F.E. Emery (ed.), Systems thinking (Baltimore:Penguin Books,1969), p.27.
43. R. Bandler and J. Grinder, The structure of magic, vol. 1 (Palo Alto: Science and Behavior Books,1975), p.28.
44. Ibid., p.31.
45. Ibid., p.40.
46. E.A. Carswell and R. Rommetviet, Social contexts of messages (New York:Academic Press,1871), p.5.
47. R. Bandler and J. Grinder. op.cit., p.157.
48. Ibid., p.160.
49. Ibid., p.158.
50. Ibid., p.160.
51. J. Haley, Uncommon therapy (New York:Ballantine Books,1973), p.19. A further explanation of what it means to say that Erickson conceptualizes a person in two parts is given by Haley in Advanced techniques of hypnosis and therapy: selected papers of Milton H. Erickson, M.D. (New York:Grune & Stratton, 1967), p.456.
Erickson's comments about "unconscious awareness" become reasonable from this view. To have an interchange with another person through an "unconscious" means of communication, we must at some level be cognizant of what we are doing or we could not correct ourselves or receive the other person's communication and respond to it. Yet this process can go on without any conscious awareness of what we are doing. Therefore there must be, at least, two levels of "awareness" when we are interchanging two levels, at least, of communication.The reference to 'levels of communication' will receive more attention in the third section of this work in a discussion of Bateson's concept of meta-message, and the 'unconscious'. We quote the above passage, with its mention of two levels of awareness, 'conscious awareness' and 'unconscious ideas' in terms of object of attention and subsidiary awareness.
52. J. Haley, Uncommon therapy, op.cit., p.192.
53. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, op.cit., p.119.
54. C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein, On the psychology of meditation (New York:The Viking Press,1971), p.142.
55. K.R. Pelletier and C. Garfield, op.cit., p.105.
56. G Bateson, op.cit., p.179.
57. We take the space to briefly mention two further possibilities of comparing Eastern and Western psychological insight using the attentive model. 1) In more thoroughly integrating the concept of feeling into a discussion of consciousness the model provides a theoretical framework that offers an opportunity for comparing the role feeling plays in various meditational practices with its role in various psycho- therapeutic techniques. In the West we find Carl Rogers claiming that
a feeling loses its explosiveness when a client brings that feeling into explicit awareness. [C. Rogers, On becoming a person (Boston:Houghton Mifflin,1961), p.318-319, for instance.] Tarthang Tulku, a Tibetan Buddhist, describes a meditational technique designed with a similar purpose in mind. It amounts to turning attention to "the immediate feeling- tone of each item of experience." [T. Tulku, ed., Reflections of mind (Emeryville,Ca.:Dharma,1975), p.13.] With the attentive model in mind we can understand that one could not successfully turn attention to an underlying feeling state without depriving it of its subsidiary status and hence of its contexting function. 2) Many of the Eastern meditational schools include techniques in which one's breathing is taken as an object of attention. Breathing is normally a habitually tacit component of experience and the East shows a great deal of understanding for the fact that breathing patterns correspond to thought processes, to the extent, for instance, that it has been suggested that one is more likely to shift attention from one object to attention to another between exhale and inhale. On the attentive model, one's breathing, when it is not paid attention to, would be conceived of as a component of subsidiary awareness having a contexting function. Milton Erickson seems to be well aware of this as is exemplified by the fact that in inducing hypnosis in one case he intentionally synchronized his words to a patient's breathing pattern, directing the patient's attention only to certain sensations corresponding with the patient's inhalations, explaining in commentary, "nobody notices inspiration and expiration, they're used to that." [J. Haley, ed., Advanced techniques of hypnosis and therapy: selected papers of Milton H. Erickson, M.D. (New York:Grune & Stratton,1967), p.53.]
In the use of another technique Erickson relies on the contexting function unheeded sensations play in consciousness. In this case Erickson intentionally uses a particular word in his verbal communications with a subject each time he witnesses a natural decrease in the rapidity of the subject's eye blink. The subject, who is attending to the verbal communications, does not notice the sensations accompanying eye blink and is not aware of the correlation between word and rate of eye blink. But subsequent use of the word by Erickson evokes slower blinking and an associated drowsy feeling. Essentially Erickson is performing a function similar to the one performed by a biofeedback instrument in a conditioning experiment of Barbara Brown's which we shall discuss in the Addendum. (see page 103). [M.H. Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi, Hypnotic realities (New York:Irvington Publishers,1976), p.268.]
58. This illustration is reproduced from M. Eliade, Patanjali and yoga, translated by C.L. Markmann (New York:Schocken Books,1975), p.94.
59. Discussions of the Shri Yantra can be found in the following selected works: M. Eliade, Yoga: immortality and freedom, 2nd ed., translated by W.R. Trask (New York:Bollingen Foundation,1969).
E. Wood, Yoga (Harmondsworth,Middlesex,England:Penguin
60. H. Zimmer, Myths and symbols in Indian art and civilization, edited by J. Campbell (New York:Pantheon Books,1946),p.140.
61. Ibid., p,143.
63. Ibid., p.146.
64. I.K. Taimni, The science of yoga (Wheaton, III:The Theosophical Publ. House,1967),p.viii.
65. Ibid., p.291.
66. Ibid., p.286.
67. Ibid., p.298.
68. Ibid., p.278.
69. Ibid., p.278.
71. Ibid., p.280.
72. Ibid., p.283.
73. Ibid., p.298.
74. P. Pott, Yoga and yantra, translated by R. Needham (The Hague:M. Nijhoff,1966), p.42.
75. H. Zimmer, op.cit., p.141.
76. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.173.
77. Ibid., p.178.
78. Ibid., p.174.
79. Ibid., p.218.
80. Ibid., p.188.
82. Indeed, we needn't take too seriously the notion of a sequence in which the mother as son's object of attention behaves in one way and then as she is relegated to the son's subsidiary awareness behaves differently. The double bind would be effective as long as, for instance, her bodily expressions insofar as they were picked up subsidiarily by the son were inconsistent with her words as he attends to them. In this context it is interesting to note that in a volume not previously considered in this study, Grinder and Bandler explicitly deny that a person's gestures and the like can stand in relationship to his verbal communications as met- message to message, and thy go on to discard the notion of meta-message altogether. This forces them into a spotlight model in which all messages stand on the same level as 'paramessages', and Bateson's distinction between a hierarchy of levels in respect of the distinction between meta-message and message is abandoned along with the term. By contrast if we interpret the distinction between meta-message and message in terms of the model, subsidiary awareness/object of attention, we preserve the hierarchical order between meta- message and message because in identifying the meta-message with experienced context, we show the meta role of the meta- message. In terms of the attentive model we experience meta- messages subsidiarily, and we experience messages by contrast as objects of attention. In this way we make sense of the idea rejected by Grinder and Bandler that a person's gestures and the like can stand in relation to his verbal communications as meta-message to message; the receiver of the messages is subsidiarily aware of the speaker's gestures. and aware of his spoken message as an object of attention. Given this understanding of meta-message it is instructive to read the following passage by Grinder and Bandler understanding its references to the therapists feelings as references to his subsidiary awareness or meta-messages. We can then view this passage as one in which Grinder and Bandler, despite themselves, give a fine example of what it is like to experience a double bind...
First, the therapist may fail to detect (consciously) the incongruities--the non-matching messages being presented by the client. Our observations of this situation are that, when a therapist fails to detect incongruities which the client is presenting, the therapist himself, initially, feels confused and uncertain. The therapist's feelings of uncertainty usually persist and he becomes more and more uncomfortable. Typically, therapists report feeling as though they were missing something. (Italics added)
J. Grinder and R. Bandler, The structure of magic, vol.2 (Palo Alto:Science and Behavior Books,1976), p.31.
83. G. Bateson, op.cit., p.182.
84. Ibid., p.163.
85. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.69.
86. Ibid., p.95.
86a. Angyal advanced a similar hypothesis when he suggested that the schizophrenic characteristically fails in apprehending and constructing frames of reference or "systems" (see page 40 of this work).
When such a frame of reference is lacking, entirely incongruous elements may be brought together by the patient. This is quite in agreement with the view I am trying to express. Without giving any further examples, I think that one is justified in saying that in the realm of intellectual operations there are certain dimensional media. We may call them fields or realms or frames of reference or context or universes of discourse or strata. Some such field is necessarily implied in any system or holistic organization. The schizophrenic thinking disturbance is characterized by a difficulty in apprehending and constructing such organized fields. [A. Angyal, "Disturbances in thinking in schizophrenia." In J.S. Kasanin (ed.) Language and thought in schizophrenia (New YOrk:Norton Library,1944), p.120.]87. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.96.
88. Ibid., p.94 Pelletier and Garfield quoting J. Silverman.
89. Ibid., p.68.
90. Ibid., p.75.
91. Ibid., p.102.
92. Ibid., p.54.
93. Ibid., p.123.
94. To show that this idea is not only found in the Yoga tradition but also in Buddhism we offer the following passage in which H. Thera describes the process by which the subject reaches what he calls 'bare attention'.
For instance, the normal visual perception, if it is of evidence or any interest to the observer, will rarely present the visual object pure and simple, but the object will appear in the light of added subjective judgments: beautiful or ugly, pleasant or unpleasant, useful, useless, or harmful. If it concerns a living being, there will
also enter into the preconceived notion: this is a personality, an ego, just as "I" am, too! ... It is the task of bare attention to eliminate all those alien additions from the object proper that is then in the field of perception. [C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein, op.cit., p.87.]
95. I.K. Taimni, op.cit., p.298. 96. In the following passage Ornstein gives a general characterization of the non-normal states of consciousness attained by practitioners of Eastern traditions. We note that his description of them invites understanding them as involving the overcoming of or disappearance of the bifurcation found in normal states of consciousness which we have modeled as subsidiary awareness/object of attention. The three major traditions that we've considered each speak of developing an awareness that allows every stimulus to enter into consciousness devoid of our normal selection process, devoid of normal tuning and normal input selection, model-building, and the normal category of systems. [C. Naranjo and R.E. Ornstein, op.cit., p.194.]
97. I.K. Taimni, op.cit., p.283.
98. M. Eliade, The two and the one, translated by J.M. Cohen (New York:Harper Torchbacks,1965), p.119.
99. K.R. Pelletier and G. Garfield, op.cit., p.111.
100. C.O. Evans, op.cit.
101. R.E. Shor, "Hypnosis and the concept of the generalized reality-orientation." In C.T. Tart (ed.), Altered states of consciousness (Garden City:Anchor Books,1969), p.243.
102. Ibid., p.242.
103. Ibid., p.245 note.
104. S. Freud, "An outline of psycho-analysis." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition, vol. 23 (London:Hogarth Press, 1964), p.164.
105. S. Freud, "The ego and the id." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition, vol. 19 (London:Hogarth Press,1961), p.16 note.
106. Ibid., p.15.
107. K.R. Pelletier, Mind as healer, mind as slayer: a holistic approach to preventing stress disorders (New York:Delta,1977), ch. 8.
108. B.Brown, op.cit., ch. 11.
109. Ibid., p.75 note/
110. Ibid., p.97.
111. Ibid., p. 362.
112. Ibid., p.61.
113. Ibid., p.96.
114. R.M Jones, The new psychology of dreaming (New York:Viking Press, 1970). ch. 3.
115. B.Brown, op.cit., p.337.
116. Ibid., p.75.
117. M. Vernon, The psychology of perception, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England:Penguin Books,1971),p.174.
118. Ibid., p.194.
119. Ibid., p.174.
120. H. Sevrin, "Does the averaged evoked response encode subliminal perception? Yes. A reply to Schwartz and Rem." Psychophysiology, vol. 12, no. 4 (1975), p.395.
122. Ibid., p.396.
124. B. Brown, op.cit., p.83.
125. H. Sevrin, "Brain wave correlates of subliminal stimulation, unconscious attention, primary- and secondary-process thinking, and repressiveness." Psychological Issues, vol. 8, no. 2 (1973), p.71
126. R.M. Whitman, Review of: "Psychoanalytic research: three approaches to the experimental study of subliminal processes" [Psychological Issues, vol 8, no. 2 (1973)] American Psychoanalytic Association Journal, vol. 23, no. 4 (1975), p.663.
127. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.176.
128. The processes of attention we have been describing and which we are
viewing as deliberate obstructions to the natural functioning of attention processes have also been investigated in laboratories using the latest advances in computer technology and brain wave research. However, no clear-cut correlation has been made between these physiological processes and subjective experience. The attentive model allows us to formulate one possibility which the research findings in this area seem to support. It is our hypothesis, then, that measures of average evoked response (AER) are measure of items becoming objects of attention. What this means is that experiments in which a subject's AER can be correlated with the presentation of a stimulus are to be construed as experiments in which a subject's object of attention can be identified by correlation with a physiological process (AER). Aer decrement, on this hypothesis, becomes the hypothesis that the decrement is a measure of the swiftness with which an object of attention is displaced by another object of attention: i.e., retention time as an object of attention. Increment of AER is a measure of an object of attention gaining in gestalt--increasing retention. Concerning findings of one experiment, Buchsbaum, one of the experimenters, tell us,
Three different effects were seen: (1) an across- session, "arousal" effect which acted on all intensities fairly evenly, affecting slope minimally: (2) an "attention" effect which operated primarily to enhance amplitude for low-intensity stimuli and this lower AER slope; and (3) a 'sensory overload" effect which operated primarily to reduce AER amplitude at high intensities. Thus reducing appears to be linked to the active phenomena of paying attention and protection from too- intense levels of sensory input. Habitual tendencies to attend to sensory stimuli may be reflected in the AER amplitude/intensity slope as well as habitual tendencies to inhibit sensory input. [M. Buchsbaum, "Self-regulation of stimulus intensity: augmenting/reducing and the averaged evoked response." In G. E. Schwartz and D. Shapiro, op.cit., p.122.]Among these effects we single out the second as an identification of the attention process which in Dixon's experiments is described as threshold lowering. However, in the AER experiments it was found that people were either reducers or augmenters. Buchsbaum does not suggest that reducers may be introverts and augmenters may be extroverts, but his findings about reducers make an interesting connection with the theory of schizophrenia we offered in Part III.
Buchsbaum and Silverman hypothesized that reducers were hypersensitive to low-level sensory stimuli and thus required some compensatory process to protect them from sensory inundation at high intensities. Indeed, AER reducers were found to have lower visual threshold ... than AER augmenters. ...And at low to moderate light levels, reducers had larger amplitude AERs than augmenters. [Ibid., p.125]
All we need to add, to make the connection we are claiming, is the following passage from Buchsbaum.
Interestingly, negative reaction/stimulus intensity functions were found by Tizard and Venables (1956) in schizophrenics--who have been reported to be extreme reducers for both the Petrie apparatus ... and the AER... [Ibid., p.127.]We might just conclude this note by suggesting that measures of AER might be fundamentally different from the biofeedback measures we have dealt with in the section on biofeedback. It could be that AER measures are measures of central nervous system operations (as Buchsbaum mentions) as distinct from measures of ANS operations. We then find ourselves in the position of saying that all measures of CNS operations are measures of changes in objects of attention, and CNS operations are connected by feedback loops with ANS operations. The attentive model then suggests that what is subjectively experienced of consciousness as subsidiary awareness/object of attention instantiates the same structure as autonomic nervous system operations/central nervous system operations. (For this use of the '/'see p.15.)
129. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.175.
131. J. Jenkins, "Remember that old theory of memory? Well, forget it." American Psychologist, Nov. 1974, p. 768.
133. M. Vernon, op.cit., p.196.
134. Ibid., p.195.
135. Ibid., p.163.
136. Ibid., p.161.
137. Ibid., p.162.
138. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche, translated by R.F.C. Hull, (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press,1969), p.95.
139. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." In Collected works, vol. 8 (New York:Pantheon Books,1960), p.101.
140. W. James, Psychology: briefer course (New York:Collier Books,1962), p.157.
141. Ibid., p.177.
142. Ibid., p.182.
143. Ibid., p.181.
144. Ibid., p.171.
145. Ibid., p.183.
146. Ibid., p.249.
147. Ibid., p.179.
148. Ibid., p.380.
149. Ibid., p.381.
151. C.C.Jung, On the nature of the psyche. op.cit., p.120.
153. Ibid., p.74.
156. M.H.Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi, Hypnotic realities (New York:Irvington Publishers,1976), p.75.
"Throughout this discussion of the varieties of double bind the reader may have noted the ease with which we could use the terms "unconscious" and "metacommunication" in the same place. These terms may in fact be in the process of becoming interchangeable. This suggests we may be witnessing a fundamental change in our world view of depth psychology whereby we are developing a new and more efficient nomenclature. Philosophers have never liked the term "unconscious', it was the academic and philosophical rejection of this term that impeded the early acceptance of Freud's psychoanalysis. The use of the term "unconscious" still divides academic and experimentally oriented psychologists form clinicians as well as doctors in physical medicine from psychiatry. The term "metacommunication", however, was developed within a mathematico-logical framework, and as such, it fits in with the world view of the research scientist as well as the clinician. It may well be that we are on the threshold of a new zeitgeist wherein we will revise the terms of depth psychology to make for a better fit with current conceptions in mathematics, cybernetics,157. R. Bandler and R. Grinder, The structure of magic, vol. 2 (Palo Alto:Science and Behavior Books,1976), p.36.
158. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche, op.cit., p.74.
159. I. Thalberg, "Freud's anatomies of the self." In R. Wollheim (ed.), Freud: a collection of critical essays (Garden City:Anchor Books,1974), p.166.
160. S. Freud, "Psychoanalysis and the establishment of the facts in legal proceedings." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol. 9 (London:Hogarth Press,1959), p.103.
161. E.A. Carswell and R. Rommetveit, op.cit., p.9-11.
162. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." op.cit., p.95.
163. J. Strachey (ed.), Standard edition of the complete works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 9. op.cit., p.101.
164. S. Freud, "The psychopathology of everyday life." In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol 6 (London:Hogarth Press,1960), p.264.
165. C.G. Jung, Dreams, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,1974), p.73.
166. Ibid., p.41.
167. Ibid., p.72.
168. Ibid., p.38.
169. M.H. Erickson, E.L. Rossi and S.I. Rossi, op.cit., p.225-6, 274-5.
170. Ibid., p.182.
171. S. Freud, The interpretation of dreams (second part). In J. Strachey (ed.), Standard Edition, vol. 5 (London:Hogarth Press,1953), p.608.
172. C.G. Jung, "A review of the complex theory." op.cit., p.101.
173. L. Frey-Rohn, From Freud to Jung, translated by F.E. Engreen and E.K. Engreen (New York:Dell Publishing,1974) p.119.
174. Ibid., p.120.
177. Ibid., p.121.
178. C.G.Jung, On the nature of the psyche, op.cit., p.123.
179. Ibid., p.124.
180. Ibid., p.112.
181. Ibid., p.113.
182. C.G. Jung, Mandala symbolism, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press,1972),p.99.
183. C.G. Jung, On the nature of the psyche op.cit., p.135.
184. Ibid., p.113.
185. E. Neumann, The origins and history of consciousness, translated by R.F.C. Hull (Princeton:Princeton Univ. Press,1954), p.xiv.
186. C.G. Jung, Dreams, op.cit., p.200.
187. E. Neumann, op.cit., p.41.
188. Ibid., p.46
189. Ibid., p.133.
190. Ibid., p.225-227.
191. Ibid., p.360.
192. Ibid., p.329.
193. Ibid., p.322.
195. Ibid., p.327.
196. Ibid., p.412.
197. Ibid., p.416.
198. M. Eliade, The two and the one, op.cit., p.118.
199. Ibid., p.121.
200. M.Eliade, Yoga, immortality and freedom, op.cit., p.42.
201. Ibid., p.47.
202. We mean to allude here to Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's tenet,
'Knowledge is structured in consciousness.' See, D. Postle, Fabric of the universe (New York:Crown Publishers, 1976)203. C.O.Evans, "Freewill and attention", Theoria to Theory (1975), p.189-205.
204. C. Castaneda, Journey to ixtlan (New York:Simon and Schuster,1972), p.101.